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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, game theory is applied to the case of price wars in a market scenario game towards 
a converging solution of Nash equilibrium. This is done using the famous Bertrand Game, starting 
first with a simple version of a game involving two players with undifferentiated products who 
move simultaneously by merely choosing their prices, and then proceed by extending the market 
scenario to a Differentiated Bertrand Game. The market scenario is based on two main rivals. 
“LOCAL” player is faced by a lower-priced “ASIAN” player who has a significantly lower 
quality product. Price wars dictate market outcomes. Implications of the game reveal interesting, 
but rather unexpected, results. Specifically, it is shown that resorting to a price war alone is not 
the optimum choice by the LOCAL player. Rather, the incumbent must not lower his price, even if 
faced by a lower priced competitor.  This runs in contrast to traditional price war theory. The 
introduction of lower priced substitutes do not reveal price reduction of the incumbent firm. A 
unique Nash equilibrium arises when the LOCAL player differentiates his products and charges 
higher prices compared to the ASIAN player. Consequently, price competition and price wars, 
when augmented by differentiated aspects of product quality, do not lead to price convergence nor 
necessarily lead to price reductions over time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ntense competition among business organizations, made even fiercer by budget constraints, production 
costs, limitations imposed by consumer preferences, open markets, and rapid technological change, has 
made it essential for business firms to make sound production decisions. Such decisions involve several 
tradeoffs, for example a higher quality product would involve charging a higher price which represents an 
opportunity cost to the firm. This is especially true when such a firm is competing with a lower quality, lower-priced 
product, in a competitive price war environment. 
 
In this paper game theory is applied to the case of price wars in a market scenario game, where a “LOCAL” 
producer faces fierce competition from an “ASIAN” producer. Competition is based on price as the ASIAN 
producer provides significantly lower quality products at prices slightly lower than those offered by the LOCAL 
producer. Results show that resorting to a price war alone is not the optimum choice by the LOCAL producer. 
Rather, the incumbent must not lower his price, even if faced by a lower priced competitor, but must educate his 
customers on the higher quality of his products. This runs in contrast to traditional price war theory. The 
introduction of lower priced substitutes do not reveal price reduction of the incumbent firm. Hence, price 
competition and price wars, when augmented by differentiated aspects of product quality, do not lead to price 
convergence nor necessarily lead to price reductions over time. 
 
THE X-MARKET  
 
The X-market is dominated by few LOCAL producing firms, which will be grouped as „LOCAL Player‟ 
for simplicity in applying game theory. Quality and prices of locally produced products are almost within the same 
range, and variations between them are minimal and insignificant. There is low brand loyalty among consumers. An 
inflow of lower-price lower-quality imports, grouped as „ASIAN Player‟, will take place. Imported products 
I 
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compete with LOCAL production on a price basis, where product quality is considerably lower while prices are 
slightly lower than locally produced products. It is assumed that inherent deficiencies in imported ASIAN products 
are not initially detected by consumers. Alternatively, the product is non-durable, hence consumer preferences do 
not include long term durability as a criteria for purchase. A cheaper lower-quality product has non-zero demand. 
 
Consequently, the X-market is highly price competitive and has low brand loyalty. Free trade is assumed, 
hence government places no quotas or tariffs on the ASIAN products. Prices are determined through free market 
forces (supply and demand).  
 
 To summarize, the X-market is characterized as (1) highly competitive in prices with threat of substitutes 
(negative penetration factor), (2) includes aggressive competition between LOCAL products and ASIAN imports, 
(3) has low brand loyalty (switching costs are not dominant), and (4) exhibits free market forces and no trade 
restrictions.  
 
THE BERTRAND GAME 
 
Overview of the Game 
 
This game involves a „continuous strategy space‟, where the strategy spaces are the prices and players 
move simultaneously. It models a duopoly segmentation of competitive markets (as with the LOCAL versus ASIAN 
players discussed above) in which two players/firms offer similar products and choose prices simultaneously in 
competition with each other to sell as much as they can. This is well-known as the „Bertrand equilibrium‟ (with 
variations in Bertrand, 1883, Hotelling, 1920, Akerlof, 1970, Benoit and Krishna, 1987, and Rasmusen, 2007). The 
model assumes a constant marginal cost, set at c = K, and demand is a linear function of the total quantity sold 
where Q(p) = A – p, implying that if p were the lowest possible price, then q = A – p (Rasmusen, 2007, p. 90). 
Hence, A is the maximum non-usage price and K is the unit cost of production (firms are cost minimizers). Let 
A=120 and K=12. This basically implies that the product can be priced as much as ten times its actual cost but not 
more (A/K=10). 
 
The Structure of the Game 
 
*Players: 
Firms A & B  
*The Order of Play: 
A & B simultaneously choose prices pa and pb from the set {0, ∞} 
*Payoffs: 
The payoff function for Firm A is: 
 
  (120 – pa) (pa – c)  if pa ≤ pb,     (1) 
 
πa  =    [(120 – pa) (pa – c)] / 2  if pa = pb,     (2) 
 
  0    if pa > pb.     (3) 
 
Analogously, the payoff for Firm B would be: 
 
  (120 – pb) (pb – c)  if pa ≥ pb,           (4) 
 
πb  =    [(120 – pb) (pb – c)] / 2  if pa = pb,           (5) 
 
  0    if pa < pb.           (6) 
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Outcome of the Game 
 
The Bertrand Game has a unique Nash equilibrium, where: pa = pb = c = 12, with qa = qb = 54. This is a 
weak Nash equilibrium because if either player deviates to a higher price, it sells zero quantity as it loses all its 
customers to its competitor offering the lower price and thus ends up with zero profits (Rasmusen, 2007). 
 
However, to prove the uniqueness of this Nash equilibrium it is useful to divide-up the possible strategy 
profile space as follows and show that in all other cases deviation will occur: 
 
*If pa < c or pb < c: The firm with the lowest price earns negative profits and could deviate to a higher more 
profitable price until its demand becomes zero. 
 
*If pa > pb > c or pb > pa > c: The firm with the higher price could deviate to a lower price below that of its rival and 
increase its payoffs from zero to positive profits. 
 
*If pa = pb > c: In this case one of the firms could profitably deviate to a price less than that of its competitor thus 
selling all the market quantity instead of half of it, so although marginal profits drop incrementally his total profits 
rise. 
 
*If pa > pb = c or pb > pa = c: The firm with the price = c could profitably increase its price while maintaining it 
below that of the other firm, thus increase its payoffs from zero to positive profits. 
 
Bertrand Game Application to the X-Market  
 
Applying the Bertrand game to the X-market under consideration, each of the two firms (LOCAL and 
ASIAN) can choose from among three alternative strategies: (i) set price higher than competitor, (ii) set price equal 
to competitor, or (iii) set price lower than competitor. The equilibrium price is reached when price of both firms are 
equal to each other, and equal to the marginal cost. Nash equilibrium implies that none of the firms has the incentive 
to deviate from equilibrium as long as the other firm does not deviate. Economic profits are equal to zero for both 
players. 
 
The main implications for this game is that since LOCAL and ASIAN players produce similar products 
with no brand loyalty among consumers, a price war would lead to both players completely defeated. Consequently, 
both LOCAL and ASIAN players earn zero economic profits and share the market equally. 
 
THE DIFFERENTIATED BERTRAND GAME 
 
Overview & Structure 
 
The Bertrand model explained above has its limitations. It fails to show that profits do not merely arise 
from the existence of two price-competing players in the market, but because of other additional factors such as 
product differentiation. The limitation in the above explained Bertrand model is basically attributed to the 
assumption of identical products offered by both players. Thus the model generates zero profits as incremental price 
discounts lead to gaining all market customers and total loss on part of the other competitor. However, if customers 
have some degree of brand loyalty due to product differentiation, the outcome of the game will differ. 
 
Here, the existence of some degree of product differentiation must slightly adjust the demand curves of 
firms A and B as follows: 
 
qa = 24 – 2pa + pb       (7) 
 
qb = 24 – 2pb + pa (8) 
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Marginal costs remain constant and are set at c = 3. The players, strategy spaces and the order of play are 
identical to the standard Bertrand Game, however the payoffs now are as follows: 
 
πa  =  (24 – 2pa + pb) (pa – c)       (9) 
 
πb  =  (24 – 2pb + pa) (pb – c)       (10) 
 
It is an implicit assumption that maximum price can be four times as much as unit cost in this game. This 
runs in contrast to the ten factor pricing of the standard Bertrand game. Rationally speaking, profit margins would be 
lower for differentiated competition as compared with homogeneous scale production. 
 
Outcome 
 
Using linear optimization, firms‟ payoffs are maximized by choosing prices: 
 
*For Firm A: 
The first-order condition: 
 
dπa  / dpa = 24 – 4pa +  pb + 2c = 0       (11) 
 
Rearranging, we get the reaction / best-response function: 
 
pa =  6 + ½ C + ¼ pb = 7.5 + ¼ pb       (12) 
 
*Similarly, for Firm B: 
The first-order condition: 
 
dπb  / dpb = 24 – 4pb +  pa + 2c = 0       (13) 
 
Rearranging, we get the reaction / best-response function: 
 
pb =  6 + ½ C + ¼ pa = 7.5 + ¼ pa       (14) 
 
 
Figure 1: Bertrand reaction functions with differentiated products 
 
Pb 
pa 10 
7.5 
10 
RA 
RB 
7.5 
6 Volume 8, Number  0                                                       June, 201 –Research Journal of Business & Economics  
5 
The equilibrium occurs where both reaction functions of Firms A and B intersect, the fact that they cross 
once indicates that we have again a unique Nash equilibrium, as depicted by Figure 1.  The equilibrium lies at the 
point where pa = pb = 10 > c, and the quantity each firm sells is 14. This is compared to a quantity of 21 had they 
chosen prices of  pa = pb = c = 3 (the equivalent unique Nash equilibrium outcome in the standard Bertrand Game). 
 
Overall, in the differentiated game, both players are better off in profits since both have a positive profit 
margin. Yet, quantity demanded for both players is now lower. Yet, both players charge the same price and have 
symmetric market shares. 
 
Application of the Differentiated Bertrand Game to the X-market 
 
The differentiated Bertrand game can now be applied to the X-market. It is worth noting that the greater the 
(absolute) value in the own price coefficient in the differentiated demand function, the less substitutable are the 
products offered by the firm. As mentioned above, the coefficient on the own price indicates the substitutability of 
the products and thus may be a proxy for the degree of product differentiation. Thus adjusting above equations to 
allow for product differentiation in the sense that Firm A (LOCAL Player) is producing a higher quality product 
compared to the ASIAN player leads to a new market scenario where: 
 
qa = 24 – 2pa + pb       (15) 
 
qb = 24 – 3pb + pa (16) 
 
These demand functions in principle imply that the ASIAN player has a higher absolute value of its price 
coefficient than the LOCAL player, hence price variations would imply that ASIAN products are more substitutable 
than LOCAL products. Rationally speaking, ASIAN products are of lower quality and hence consumer preferences 
would prefer LOCAL products over ASIAN if offered at similar prices. Higher quality LOCAL products have more 
brand loyalty.  
 
The pay-offs for each of the two firms (LOCAL and ASIAN) respectively are: 
 
πa  =  (24 – 2pa + pb) (pa – c)       (17) 
 
πb  =  (24 – 3pb + pa) (pb – c)       (18) 
 
Thus the applied outcome of the game will be: 
 
*For Firm A (LOCAL): 
The first-order condition: 
 
dπa  / dpa = 24 – 4pa +  pb + 2c = 0       (19) 
 
Rearranging, we get the reaction / best-response function: 
 
pa =  6 + ½ C + ¼ pb = 7.5 + ¼ pb       (20) 
 
*For Firm B (ASIAN): 
 
The first-order condition: 
 
dπb  / dpb = 24 – 6pb +  pa + 3c = 0       (21) 
 
Rearranging, we get the reaction / best-response function: 
 
pb =  4 + ½ C + 1/6 pa = 4 + 1/6 pa       (22) 
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Using substitution, pa  at equilibrium will be 8.8, while pb will be 5.5.  
 
Therefore,  
 
pa > pb       (23) 
 
Calculating the pay-offs for each of the two firms, we now get: 
 
πa  =  (24 – 2(8.8) + 5.5) (8.8 – c)   
     = 104.72 – 11.9 c        (24)  
 
πb  =  (24 – 3(5.5) + 8.8) (5.5 – c) 
     = 89.65 – 16.3 c       (25) 
 
Based on the above, the payoffs of firm A (LOCAL Player) as a result of introducing the differentiated 
product (in terms of superior quality) are higher than those of firm B (ASIAN Player). However, a higher price, as 
charged by firm A, is expected to lead to a lower demand and thus, a lower market share. In this regard, demand is 
estimated as follows: 
 
qa = 24 – 2pa + pb = 11.9       (26) 
 
qb = 24 – 3pb + pa = 16.3       (27) 
 
The LOCAL player will charge a higher price and will therefore have a higher profit margin than the 
ASIAN player. The LOCAL player can signal his degree of differentiation of a higher quality product by charging a 
higher price. However, the ASIAN player, although producing a lower quality and a lower priced product, will 
effectively dominate the market. 
 
Hence, for the differentiated game, a Nash equilibrium will be stable if: (1) the LOCAL firm continues to 
charge higher prices, and (2) the ASIAN firm continues to dominate the market. Yet overall, the LOCAL firm will 
achieve higher economic profits than the ASIAN firm. 
 
This argument encourages product differentiation (enhanced products). Moreover, the ASIAN player might 
be expected to react to the LOCAL Player's strategy by increasing their product quality (Tsai, 2003 and Rasmusen, 
2007). Therefore, further product differentiation on the part of the LOCAL player to maintain its client base or even 
expand in the market is rendered essential.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper is an analysis of price wars in a differentiated market scenario. Even if faced by lower price 
competitors, an incumbent firm should not reduce prices. This conclusion runs in contrast to traditional price war 
theory. On the same line of thought, economists Tom Nagle at Boston Consulting, Adam Brandenberger of Harvard 
and Barry Nalebuff of Yale argued that “cutting prices to gain market share - as opposed to doing it because of a 
cost advantage - can often permanently hurt both profits and revenues" (Henderson, 1997). The traditional approach 
is for firms to invest in process innovation, lower cost of production and thus offer their products at lower prices. An 
alternative approach would be to invest in product innovation towards a more differentiated product in order to relax 
aggressive price competition. In that case, they will be able to develop a competitive edge based on higher quality 
products rather than lower prices. This paper proves that the alternative approach is more worthy. 
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